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Abstract 
This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model in which (i) the rate of capacity utilization is 
adjusted in the short run, (ii) the profit share and the rate of employment are adjusted in the 
medium run, and (iii) the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of capital 
accumulation are adjusted in the long run. The long-run equilibrium is a continuum of 
equilibria and is characterized by hysteresis in that the long-run position of the economy 
depends on where it starts. An increase in the bargaining power of workers lowers the rate of 
unemployment in both the medium-run and the long-run equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper develops a Kaleckian growth model in which the rate of employment is 
endogenously determined. Using the model, we investigate the short-run, medium-run, and 
long-run equilibria. 
Thus far, a number of Kaleckian models have been developed and improved.1 Kaleckian 
models have the following four characteristics (Lavoie, 1992, 1995): (1) the investment 
function; (2) prices relative to direct costs are influenced by a broad range of factors, often 
summarized under the phrase “degree of monopoly”; (3) marginal costs are assumed to be 
constant up to full capacity; and (4) the rate of capacity utilization is assumed to be generally 
below unity. In early Kaleckian models, the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of capital 
accumulation are determined with income distribution given exogenously. New Kaleckian 
models were then proposed in which income distribution is endogenously determined with the 
theory of conflicting-claims inflation.2 
However, Marxists and Sraffians criticize the Kaleckian model, claiming that the Kaleckian 
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model is a short-run, medium-run model and not a long-run model (Auerbach and Skott, 1988; 
Duménil and Lévy, 1999; Park, 1997). In the Kaleckian model, the equilibrium rate of capacity 
utilization diverges from the normal rate of capacity utilization. Critics assert that this 
divergence does not last and should vanish in the long run; accordingly, the Kaleckian model 
lacks logical consistency. For Marxists and Sraffians, the long-run equilibrium is a state where 
all variables are fully adjusted. 
In contrast to this criticism, Lavoie (1995, 2002, 2003) and Cassetti (2006) introduce the 
adjustment process of the normal rate of capacity utilization in the long run.3 They show that 
even in the long-run equilibrium where the actual rate of capacity utilization and the normal 
rate of capacity utilization are equalized, “the paradox thrift” and “the paradox of cost” hold, 
which are important characteristics of the Kaleckian model. Here, the paradox of thrift means 
that an increase in capitalists’ propensity to save lowers the rate of capital accumulation. The 
paradox of cost means that an increase in the real wage leads to an increase in the realized 
profit rate. 
However, even such extended models miss an important point, that is, the determination of 
the rate of employment, which we focus on in this paper. Conventional Kaleckian growth 
models assume that labor supply is unlimited and that firms employ as many workers as they 
desire at given wages. If, however, the labor supply grows at an exogenously given rate, there 
is no guarantee that the endogenously determined growth rate of employment would be equal 
to the growth rate of labor supply. Thus, if the growth of labor supply steadily exceeds that of 
the labor demand, then the rate of unemployment will keep on increasing; however, this is 
unrealistic.4 
Therefore, we extend the Kaleckian model to determine the rate of employment, and to 
investigate how changes in parameters affect the rate of employment. 
Our paper is not an initial attempt to explicitly consider the determination of the rate of 
employment in the Kaleckian model. Stockhammer (2004) presents an augmented Kaleckian 
model that incorporates equations that determine employment and income distribution, and 
investigates the rate of employment in the long-run equilibrium. However, the notion of the 
long run in Stockhammer (2004) is different from that in the present paper. The long run in 
Stockhammer’s model corresponds to the medium run in our model. Moreover, we determine 
employment and income distribution differently, and thus, we obtain different results from 
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those obtained by Stockhammer. 
To determine the rate of employment, we endogenize the growth rate of labor productivity, 
which is given exogenously in conventional Kaleckian models.5 We assume that the growth 
rate of labor productivity depends positively on the level of employment rate. Such a 
formulation is also proposed by Bhaduri (2006) and Dutt (2006). Based on the idea of Marx, 
Bhaduri states that this captures a view that technological change is driven by inter-class 
conflict over income distribution between workers and capitalists. Dutt says that as the labor 
market tightens and a labor shortage becomes clear, the bargaining power of workers increases, 
which exerts an upward pressure on wages, leading capitalists to adopt labor-saving technical 
changes.6 Bhaduri’s (2006) model is not a Kaleckian one because income distribution is not 
determined by mark-up pricing. However, it bears similarity to the Kaleckian model in that 
effective demand plays a crucial role in determining output. In contrast, Dutt’s (2006) model 
can be said to be Kaleckian, but it does not deal with issues such as income distribution or 
inflation because its purpose is to present a simple growth model that integrates the roles of 
aggregate demand and supply. 
In determining technological change, mainstream growth theory emphasizes supply side 
factors such as R&D investment and human capital accumulation. In contrast, we emphasize 
on the demand side factors contributing to technological change: changes in aggregate demand 
cause changes in employment, which lead to technological change. Under our formulation, 
“the natural rate of growth” becomes an endogenous variable. Here, we define the natural rate 
of growth as a sum of the growth rate of labor productivity and that of labor supply. Although 
the growth rate of labor supply in our model is exogenously given, the growth rate of labor 
productivity is endogenously determined, and consequently, the natural rate of growth is an 
endogenous variable. Our formulation suggests that the natural rate of growth increases when 
business is good (i.e., when the rate of employment is high), while it decreases when business 
is bad (i.e., when the rate of employment is low). This property is consistent with the empirical 
studies of León-Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002), Libânio (2009), and Vogel (2009). Therefore, 
our formulation of technological change is reasonable in that it describes an important feature 
of the real world. 
The framework of our model is based on Cassetti (2006). He introduces the theory of 
conflicting-claims inflation into the Kaleckian model and analyzes the medium-run and 
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long-run equilibria. We introduce the abovementioned endogenous technical change into 
Cassetti’s (2006) model and analyze the short-run, medium-run, and long-run equilibria. In the 
short run, the rate of capacity utilization is adjusted. In the medium run, the profit share and 
the rate of employment are adjusted.7 In the long run, the normal rate of capacity utilization 
and the expected rate of capital accumulation are adjusted.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework 
of our model and analyzes the short-run equilibrium. Section 3 conducts a medium-run 
analysis. Section 4 conducts a long-run analysis and also presents numerical examples. Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Short-run analysis 
2.1 Basic framework of the model 
Consider an economy with workers and capitalists. Suppose that workers consume all their 
wages and capitalists save a fraction s  of their profits. Then, the ratio of the real saving S  
to the capital stock K , that is, KSg s /=  leads to 
 srgs = , (1) 
where r  denotes the rate of profit. 
Suppose that firms operate with the following fixed coefficients production function: 
 })/(,min{ KkuaEY = , (2) 
where Y  denotes real output; E , employment; and EYa /= , the level of labor 
productivity.8 The rate of capacity utilization is defined as ∗= YYu / , where ∗Y  denotes the 
potential output. The coefficient ∗= YKk /  denotes the ratio of the capital stock to the 
potential output, which is assumed to be constant. This assumption means that both K  and 
∗Y  grow at the same rate. Moreover, when the rate of capacity utilization is constant, the 
growth rate of capital stock and that of the actual output will be the same. Accordingly, the 
actual output and the potential output grow at the same rate in the equilibrium where the rate 
of capacity utilization is constant. To simplify the analysis, we assume 1=k  in what follows. 
From this, we have mur = , where m  denotes the profit share. 
Let us introduce the investment function. Following Amadeo (1986) and Lavoie (2006), we 
specify the ratio of the real investment I  to the capital stock, KIgd /= , as follows: 
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 )( nd uug −+= εγ , (3) 
where γ  denotes a constant term capturing the expected rate of growth; ε , a positive 
parameter; and nu , a normal rate of capacity utilization. Firms determine the normal rate of 
capacity utilization through convention, historical experience, and strategic considerations. 
Equation (3) states that investment responds to the gap between the actual rate of capacity 
utilization and the normal rate of capacity utilization.9 If the actual rate of capacity utilization 
is equal to the normal rate of capacity utilization, firms expand plants at the same pace as the 
expected rate of growth. If, however, the actual rate of capacity utilization falls short of the 
normal rate of capacity utilization, firms consider themselves as facing excess capacity, and 
they decrease the rate of capital accumulation. If, on the other hand, the actual rate of capacity 
utilization exceeds the normal rate of capacity utilization, firms increase the rate of capital 
accumulation faster than the expected rate of growth. 
 
2.2 Short-run equilibrium 
In the short run, quantity adjustment through the rate of capacity utilization prevails. Here, K , 
N , a , the price p , and the money wage w  are fixed, and employment E  is adjusted. An 
equation of motion for the rate of capacity utilization can be formulated by 
 0),( >−= αα sd ggu& , (4) 
where α  denotes the speed of adjustment of the goods market. Equation (4) shows that 
excess demand leads to a rise in the rate of capacity utilization, while excess supply leads to a 
decline in the rate of capacity utilization. 
The short-run equilibrium is defined as a situation where 0=u& . In this case, we have 






uu n . (5) 
Hereafter, short-run equilibrium values are denoted with “*.” Substituting equation (5) in 






musg n )( . (6) 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the short-run equilibrium to be stable is given by 
0/ <duud & , which implies 0>−εsm . This condition is called the Keynesian stability 
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condition (Marglin and Bhaduri, 1990), which means that saving responds to the rate of 
capacity utilization more strongly than investment. In addition, for 0>∗u , we need 
0>− nuεγ .10 This condition means that the rate of capital accumulation is positive even 
when the rate of capacity utilization is zero. 
The derivatives of equations (5) and (6) with respect to s  are both negative. That is, a rise 
in capitalists’ propensity to save lowers both the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of 
capital accumulation. The latter effect is called the paradox of thrift. 
The derivatives of equations (5) and (6) with respect to m  are both negative. That is, a rise 
in the profit share lowers both the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of capital 
accumulation. The former effect shows that the short-run equilibrium is the stagnationist 
regime and the latter effect shows that the short-run equilibrium is the wage-led growth 
regime.11 
 
3 Medium-run analysis 
3.1 Dynamics of the profit share and the employment rate 
In the medium run, the short-run equilibrium is always attained and the profit share and the 
rate of employment are adjusted. Here, K , N , a , p , and w , which are fixed in the short 
run, change. 
From the definition of the profit share, we have )/(1 pYwEm −= , from which we obtain 









m &&&& +−=−1 . (7) 
To know the dynamics of the profit share, we have to specify the dynamics of the price, the 
money wage, and the labor productivity.  
We specify the dynamics of the money wage and price by using the theory of 
conflicting-claims inflation. First, suppose that the growth rate of the money wage that 
workers manage to negotiate depends on the discrepancy between their target profit share and 
the actual profit share. Second, suppose that firms set their price to close the gap between their 
target profit share and the actual profit share. From these considerations, the dynamics of the 
money wage and price can be described, respectively, as follows: 
 10,0),( <<>−= wwww mmmw
w θθ& , (8) 
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 10,0),( <<>−= ffff mmmp
p θθ& , (9) 
where wθ  and fθ  are the speed of adjustment, wm  is the target profit share set by workers, 
and fm  is the target profit share set by firms. In our model, the target profit shares are 
exogenously given. However, we can endogenize them. For example, Dutt (1992) and Cassetti 
(2002, 2003) assume that the target of workers depends negatively on the rate of employment. 
In this case, combining equation (8) with equation (9), we obtain a real-wage Phillips curve 
such that the growth rate of the real wage rate depends positively on the rate of employment. 
With this Phillips curve, we can build a Kaleckian model in which the equilibrium rate of 
employment is endogenously determined.13 As stated in Introduction, we use a different way 
to endogenize the equilibrium rate of employment. 
In the following analysis, we assume that wf mm > . Firms attempt to set their targets as 
high as possible whereas workers attempt to set their targets as low as possible. Therefore, the 
assumption wf mm >  is reasonable. We can interpret wθ  and fθ  as the bargaining power 
of workers and that of firms, respectively (Lavoie, 1992, p. 393; Cassetti, 2002, p. 192; 
Cassetti, 2003, p. 453). We assume 1=+ wf θθ  and define θθ ≡f  because bargaining 
power is a relative concept. We then obtain θθ −=1w , where 10 <<θ .14 For example, we 
can consider an increase in the unionization rate as a factor for raising the bargaining power of 
workers (i.e., a decrease in θ ), and an increase in the market power of oligopolistic firms as a 
factor for raising the bargaining power of firms (i.e., an increase in θ ). 
We now turn to the specification of endogenous technological change. As stated above, we 
assume that the growth rate of labor productivity aaga /&=  depends positively on the rate of 
employment e . 
 0,0,)( >>= ψλλ ψeega , (10) 
where NEe /=  denotes the rate of employment, N  the exogenous labor supply, λ  a 
positive constant, and ψ  the elasticity of the growth rate of labor productivity with respect to 
the rate of employment. We use the above specification to conduct numerical simulations in 
what follows. Note, however, that our results do not depend on this specification as long as the 
growth rate of labor productivity is increasing in the rate of employment. In addition, the 
non-linearity of equation (10), when 1≠ψ , does not concern with the local stability of 
equilibrium and results of comparative statics analysis. Nevertheless, the non-linearity can 
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affect the global behavior of each endogenous variable. 
Let us explain the difference between equation (10) and specifications of Bhaduri (2006) 
and Dutt (2006). Equation (10) and their specifications bear similarities but differ in some 
respects. In Bhaduri’s (2006) model, a change in the growth rate of labor productivity ( ag& ) 
depends positively on the rate of change in the employment rate ( ee /& ). Dutt (2006) presents 
two kinds of specifications. In the first model of Dutt (2006), the rate of change in the growth 
rate of labor productivity ( aa gg /& ) depends positively on the rate of change in the 
employment rate ( ee /& ). In these specifications, it is the growth rate of labor productivity, not 
the employment rate that is endogenously determined. In this paper, to examine how the 
employment is determined, we relate the growth rate of labor productivity ( ag ) to the 
employment rate ( e ). In the second model of Dutt (2006), the rate of change in the growth rate 
of labor productivity ( aa gg /& ) depends negatively on the employment rate ( e ). In addition, 
when the employment rate is equal to its natural rate Ne , the rate of change in the growth rate 
of labor productivity will be zero. From this, the steady-state employment rate is equal to the 
natural rate. The natural rate Ne  is exogenously given, and then, it does not depend on other 
parameters of the model. In our model, both the growth rate of labor productivity and the 
employment rate are simultaneously determined, and moreover, the employment rate does 
depend on parameters. 
Substituting equations (8), (9), and (10) in equation (7), we obtain an equation of motion for 
the profit share: 
 )]()[1( egAmmm a−−−−=& , (11) 
where wf mmA )1( θθ −+≡ . We assume that nA > , which means that a weighted average of 
the two groups’ target profit shares is larger than the growth rate of labor supply. Given that 
the size of n  is about 10 percent at most, this assumption is plausible. 
Let us derive an equation of motion for the rate of employment. From equation (2), the rate 






ad −−+= )(&& , (12) 
where n  is the growth rate of N  and given exogenously. 
 
3.2 Medium-run equilibrium 
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In the medium run, as stated above, the short-run equilibrium is always attained, and 
consequently, the rate of change of u  is zero. Substituting equations (3) and (10) in equation 









εγ& . (13) 
Equations (11) and (13) describe the medium-run dynamics. 
Let us find the medium-run equilibrium. Combining 0=m&  with 0=e& , we obtain the 
following quadratic equation for the profit share: 
 0)(2 =−+Θ− nAmsm ε , (14) 
where 0)()( >+−+−≡Θ εεγ nAsus n . 
From equation (14), we obtain two real and distinct roots. However, the larger root 






)(42 −−Θ+Θ=∗∗ ε . (15) 
Hereafter, medium-run equilibrium values are denoted with “**.” Using equation (15), we 










∗∗ Ame . (16) 
To analyze the local stability of the medium-run equilibrium, we linearize equations (11) 
































All elements are evaluated at the medium-run equilibrium, though we omit “**” to avoid 
troublesome notations. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the medium-run 
equilibrium are given by both 0tr <J  and 0det >J , where Jtr  denotes the trace of J  
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and Jdet  the determinant of J . In our model, these conditions are satisfied because 
0)()(tr 2211 <−+−=+= JJJ , 
0))(())((det 21122211 >−+−−−=−= JJJJJ . 
Therefore, the medium-run equilibrium is locally stable. 
 
3.3 Comparative statics in the medium-run equilibrium 
Table 1 summarizes the results of comparative statics in the medium-run equilibrium.16 
 
Table 1: Results for medium-run comparative statics analysis 
  A  s  n  
∗∗m  +  −  −  
∗∗e  −  −  −  
∗∗u  −  −  +  
∗∗g  −  −  +  
Note: wf mmA )1( θθ −+≡  and wf mm > . 
 
Note that an increase in A  means an increase in θ .17 An increase in the bargaining power 
of firms decreases the rate of utilization rate and the rate of employment. This implies that a 
policy for weakening the bargaining power of workers cannot lower the rate of unemployment. 
Stockhammer (2004) also investigates the relationship between bargaining power and 
unemployment. He concludes that in the profit-led growth regime, a decline in the bargaining 
power of workers leads to lower unemployment. However, in the wage-led growth regime of 
Stockhammer’s model, the equilibrium is unstable, and consequently, we cannot investigate 
the relationship between bargaining power and unemployment.18 In our model, in contrast, the 
medium-run equilibrium is stable even though it is wage-led growth. The reason for this 
stability is a stabilizing effect of the endogenous labor-saving technological change. Our result 
is consistent with the empirical result of Storm and Naastepad (2007, 2008). Using data for 20 
OECD countries during the period 1984–1997, they show that an increase in the bargaining 
power of firms due to labor market deregulation raises the rate of unemployment in contrast to 
the view of mainstream theory. 
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An increase in the saving rate decreases the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of 
employment. In Stockhammer (2004), the equilibrium rate of employment consists of the 
exogenous natural rate of growth and parameters of the investment function and the income 
distribution function, and does not depend on the saving rate. Hence, a change in the saving 
rate never affects the rate of employment. In our model, on the other hand, the natural rate of 
growth is endogenously determined and a change in the saving rate affects the rate of 
employment accordingly. 
The effect of an increase in the target profit shares fm  and wm  is similar to that of an 
increase in θ  discussed above. An important issue in the Kaleckian tradition is what regime 
is obtained in the equilibrium. As stated in the short-run analysis, classification of regimes is 
based on the relationship between the profit share, the rate of capacity utilization and the rate 
of capital accumulation. Note, however, that the profit share in the medium-run is not an 
exogenous but an endogenous variable. Nevertheless, because fm  and wm  change in the 
same direction as ∗∗m , we can use these variables as a proxy for the actual profit share. An 
increase in fm  or wm  leads to a decline in both 
∗∗u  and ∗∗g . From this, we can conclude 
that the medium-run equilibrium corresponds to both stagnationist regime and wage-led 
growth regime, which are typical of the Kaleckian model. 
 
4 Long-run analysis 
4.1 Dynamics of the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of growth 
In the long run, the medium-run equilibrium is always attained and the normal rate of capacity 
utilization and the expected rate of growth are adjusted. We follow Lavoie (1996), Dutt (1997), 
Lavoie et al. (2004), and Cassetti (2006) to describe the long-run dynamics.19 
First, we introduce the following adjustment equation for the normal rate of capacity 
utilization: 
 0),( >−= ∗∗ φφ nn uuu& , (17) 
where φ  denotes the speed of adjustment. Equation (17) states that the normal rate of 
capacity utilization is adjusted according to the gap between the actual rate of capacity 
utilization and the normal rate of capacity utilization. Note that we have ),( γnuuu ∗∗∗∗ =  
from the medium-run analysis. 




 0),( >−= ∗∗ ηγηγ g& , (18) 
where η  denotes the speed of adjustment. Equation (18) shows that the expected rate of 
growth is adjusted according to the gap between the actual growth rate and the expected rate of 
growth, which corresponds to adaptive expectations. Because we have )( nuug −+= ∗∗∗∗ εγ , 
we can rewrite equation (18) as follows: 
 )( nuu −= ∗∗ηεγ& . (19) 
The empirical validity of simultaneous adjustments of nu  and γ  is discussed by Lavoie 
et al. (2004). They empirically test four kinds of investment functions—the French Marxist 
equation, the naive Kaleckian equation, the American Marxist equation, and the hysteresis 
Kaleckian equation—by using data from the Canadian manufacturing sector and the total 
industrial sector during the period 1960–2000. Their results show that the hysteresis Kaleckian 
equation performs better than the other three specifications. In contrast, Skott (2008) criticizes 
Lavoie et al. (2004): their estimated empirical hysteresis Kaleckian equation bears no relation 
to the theoretical model. In either case, because we cannot directly observe the normal rate of 
capacity utilization, we need to devise methods for an empirical study.20 In addition, because 
Lavoie et al. (2004) and Skott (2008) use only Canadian data, we also need to investigate other 
countries to ascertain the validity of the hysteresis Kaleckian investment function. 
 
4.2 Long-run equilibrium 
We derive the long-run equilibrium. A system of differential equations composed of equations 
(17) and (19) takes a special form called a zero root system, in which one eigenvalue of the 
Jacobian matrix is zero.21 
In the long-run equilibrium, we obtain nuu =∗∗ , which yields the following relationship 









)(γ . (20) 
This is an upward-sloping curve through the origin with sun /1=  being an asymptote. Points 
on this curve correspond to the long-run equilibria. Note, however, that not all the points on 
this curve are long-run equilibria and some constraints are imposed. To begin with, the rate of 
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capacity utilization has to be smaller than unity. This constraint is located to the left of the 
asymptote sun /1=  because 10 << s . Next, we have nuεγ >  from the short-run analysis. 
This constraint means that the long-run equilibria have to be located above the straight line 
nuεγ = . Finally, we have 0>−εsm  from the short-run analysis. This constraint means that 
the long-run equilibria have to be larger than snAs /)]([ −−= εγ . 
For any initial condition within the constraints, there exists a unique long-run equilibrium.23 
From equations (17) and (19), we obtain the relationship nu&& )/( φηεγ = , from which we have 
the constant ratio nu)/( φηεγ =  along the transitional process. Hence, the transitional 
process is given by the following upward sloping straight line: 
 )0()0()()( nn utut φ
ηεγφ
ηεγ −+= , (21) 
where )0(γ  and )0(nu  are initial conditions. The intersection of equations (21) and (20) 
yields the long-run equilibrium. 
The long-run equilibrium values are given by 
 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ = γg , (22) 
 nga −= ∗∗∗∗∗∗ γ , (23) 

















∗∗∗ ne . (26) 
The long-run equilibrium values are denoted with “***.” Given initial conditions, we can 
determine the long-run value of ∗∗∗γ , which determines equations (22) through (26). What is 
important here is that different initial conditions produce different long-run values of ∗∗∗γ . 
Therefore, the long-run equilibrium shows path-dependency. 
 
Figure 1: Convergence to the long-run equilibrium 
 
Figure 1 shows the long-run phase diagram. As stated above, the locus of 0== nu&&γ  is an 
upward-sloping curve. The constraints nuεγ =  and snAs /)]([ −−= εγ  are also drawn in 
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Figure 1.24 The solution path denoted by the solid line starting from point A converges to the 
long-run equilibrium point denoted by E1, whereas the solution path denoted by the solid line 
starting from point B converges to long-run equilibrium E2. For this reason, if the initial point 
is different, then the corresponding long-run equilibrium is also different. 
The long-run equilibrium is not always stable. If the coefficient φηε / , the slope of the 
solution path, is extremely large, the economy cannot reach the long-run equilibrium. This 
phenomenon arises when the speed of adjustment of the expected rate of growth is large, when 
the coefficient of the investment function is large, and when the speed of adjustment of the rate 
of capacity utilization is small. These discussions are also shown in Figure 1. The solution path 
denoted by the broken line starting from point A crosses the locus of 0== nu&&γ  at a point 
where nu  exceeds unity, and consequently, the path is divergent. The solution path denoted 
by the broken line starting from point B crosses the constraint, and consequently, that path is 
also divergent. 
Moreover, even if the slope of the solution path is small, the economy cannot reach the 
long-run equilibrium depending on the position of the initial value.  
From these observations, it follows that both the size of the speed of adjustment and the 
initial position are crucial to the stable convergence to the long-run equilibrium. 
 
4.3 Comparative statics in the long-run equilibrium 
Table 2 shows the results of comparative statics in the long-run equilibrium. 
 
Table 2: Results for long-run comparative statics analysis 
  A  s  n  
∗∗∗m  +  −  −  
∗∗∗e  −  −  −  
∗∗∗u  −  −  +  
∗∗∗g  −  −  +  
 
When s  or A  increases, the curve represented by equation (20) rotates counterclockwise 
around the origin. Because the solution path is unaffected by the change in s  or A , the 
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intersection of the solution path and the curve moves toward the lower left. Therefore, both the 
normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of growth decrease.  
When n  increases, the curve rotates clockwise, and hence, the long-run equilibrium values 
of ∗∗∗u  and ∗∗∗γ  increase. 
The results in Table 2 are the same as those in Table 1. In the long run, an increase in the 
bargaining power of firms also lowers the rate of employment. 
Let us compare our results with those of Dutt (2006). In the long run of Dutt’s model, the 
growth rate of labor productivity and the autonomous rate of growth (i.e., the expected rate of 
growth in our model) are adjusted. The adjustment of labor productivity growth is equivalent 
to the adjustment of the rate of employment because in Dutt’s model, productivity growth is an 
increasing function of the rate of employment. The long-run equilibrium has a path-dependent 
property and depends on the saving rate, the growth rate of labor supply, and the coefficient of 
the rate of capacity utilization in the investment function. An increase in the saving rate lowers 
the rate of employment and the rate of capital accumulation. An increase in the growth rate of 
labor supply lowers the rate of employment and raises the rate of capital accumulation. These 
results are the same as our results. A rise in the coefficient of the rate of capacity utilization in 
the investment function increases both the rate of employment and the rate of capital 
accumulation. In our model, in contrast, a change in the coefficient in the investment function 
does not affect the long-run equilibrium value: in the long-run equilibrium, the actual rate of 
capacity utilization and the normal rate of capacity utilization are equalized, and accordingly, 
the effect of the rate of utilization on investment vanishes. Our model extends the results of 
Dutt (2006) in that (i) unlike Dutt’s model, long-run income distribution is endogenously 
determined and (ii) our model can investigate the effect of the bargaining power on the rate of 
employment. 
How are our results modified if we do not consider the adjustment process of the expected 
rate of growth and if we consider only the adjustment process of the normal rate of capacity 
utilization? This corresponds to considering γ  as a parameter rather than an endogenous 
variable. In this case, the adjustment process of nu  is stable and the long-run equilibrium 
values are given by equations (22) through (26) with γ  being a parameter. It follows from 
this that the long-run equilibrium values of the rate of capital accumulation, the growth rate of 
labor productivity, and the rate of employment do not depend on relative bargaining power. 
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On the other hand, how are our results modified if we do not consider the adjustment 
process of the normal rate of capacity utilization and if we consider only the adjustment 
process of the expected rate of growth? In this case, the adjustment process of γ  is unstable: 
if there is any divergence from the long-run equilibrium, then the divergence continues to 
expand cumulatively. This reminds us of Harrod’s instability principle (Lavoie, 1995, p. 806). 
Summarizing these discussions, we can understand that because we allow both the normal 
rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of growth to adjust simultaneously, the 
long-run equilibrium will be stable and depend on bargaining power. 
The adjustment process of the expected rate of growth also concerns the long-run 
equilibrium regime. As is the case with the medium-run equilibrium, we investigate the 
relationship between fm  or wm , and 
∗∗∗u  and ∗∗∗g . An increase in fm  or wm  lowers 
the long-run equilibrium value of the rate of capacity utilization, irrespective of whether the 
expected rate of growth is endogenous or exogenous. This means that the long-run equilibrium 
is the stagnationist regime. If the expected rate of growth is endogenous, then an increase in 
fm  or wm  lowers the long-run equilibrium value of the rate of capital accumulation, which 
shows that that the long-run equilibrium is the wage-led growth regime. However, if the 
expected rate of growth is exogenous, then changes in fm  and wm  do not affect the 
long-run equilibrium value of the rate of capital accumulation. 
 
4.4 Numerical examples 
In the foregoing analysis, we separate the short run, the medium run, and long run. In this 
subsection, we consider the adjustment process of the five endogenous variables all together: 
the rate of capacity utilization, profit share, employment rate, normal rate of capacity 
utilization, and expected rate of growth. The property of the equilibrium is identical in both the 
model in which the three runs are distinguished and the five-variable model. However, the 
transitional dynamics toward equilibrium can differ between the two models. For this purpose, 
we need to analyze the system of five differential equations that consist of equations (4), (11), 
(12), (17), and (18). Whereas analytical treatment of high-order differential equations is 
troublesome, numerical analysis is relatively easy, which we now turn to.25 
For numerical simulations, we set parameters as follows: 
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1,1,9.0,15.0,1,08.0,05.0,75.0,2.0,3.0,3.0 =========== ηφψλαεθ nsmm wf . 
If the five-dimensional model exhibits path-dependency, different initial conditions must 
produce different steady-state values under exactly the same parameter setting. Table 3 shows 
the results of this numerical analysis. 
 












u  0.6 0.39 0.7 0.69 
m  0.2 0.26 0.3 0.37 
e  0.7 0.14 0.8 0.93 
nu  0.7 0.39 0.8 0.69 
γ  0.1 0.08 0.2 0.19 
 
The initial values in Case 1 are smaller than those in Case 2. From Table 3, we find that if we 
change initial conditions, we obtain different long-run equilibrium values. Therefore, in this 
five-dimensional dynamical system, we also have path-dependency.26 
 Moreover, non-monotonic dynamics emerge in the five-dimensional system. Parameters and 
initial values are set as follows: 
1,1,2.1,15.0,7,3.0,05.0,7.0,2.0,3.0,3.0 =========== ηφψλαεθ nsmm wf  
2.0)0(,8.0)0(,8.0)0(,3.0)0(,6.0)0( ===== γnuemu . 
Note that in this case, ε , that is, the sensitivity of investment to the capacity utilization, and 
α , that is, the adjustment speed of the goods market, are larger than those in Cases 1 and 2. 
Larger ε  and α  are destabilizing factors. Time path of each variable is drawn in Figure 2, 
from which we can see that each variable converge to its long-run equilibrium with oscillation. 
Whereas we do not observe such a behavior when we separate the three runs, we can observe a 
cyclical fluctuation when we combine the three runs altogether. 
We note that in the five-dimensional system, nu  and γ  synchronize as in the model in 
section 4. Hence, if we plot the dynamics of nu  and γ  on the nu -γ plane, we obtain a 
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solution path as one in figure 1. 
 
Figure 2: Cyclical fluctuations in the five-dimensional system 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed a Kaleckian model that considers the determination of the 
rate of employment. For this purpose, we have introduced endogenous technological change 
into a Kaleckian model with conflicting-claims inflation. 
We have also discussed how the endogenous variables in our model are determined in the 
long run where the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of growth are 
adjusted. This is an answer to the criticism that the Kaleckian model lacks logical consistency 
in the long run. We have shown that the results in the medium-run equilibrium are carried over 
to the long-run equilibrium. In this sense, the Kaleckian model can be used for long-run 
analysis. 
In our model, both the medium-run and the long-run employment rate depend on the 
relative bargaining power between workers and capitalists. A rise in the bargaining power of 
capitalists increases the unemployment rate, which is contrary to the assertion of mainstream 
theory. As long as the medium-run and the long-run regime experience wage-led growth, a 
policy intended to raise the bargaining power of capitalists is unfavorable for a reduction in the 
unemployment rate. 
Long-run equilibrium values have path-dependent properties. As such, slightly different 
initial conditions are likely to produce large differences in both the transitional path to the 
long-run equilibrium and the position of the long-run equilibrium itself, which can account for 
cross-country differences in the long-run unemployment rate. 
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1 See Kalecki (1971) for his economic theory. For the framework of the Kaleckian model, see 
Rowthorn (1981), Lavoie (1992), Foley and Michl (1999, ch. 10), Blecker (2002), and Taylor 
(2004, ch. 5). 
2 The theory of conflicting-claims inflation is developed by Rowthorn (1977). For Kaleckian 
models with the conflicting-claims inflation, see Dutt (1987) and Cassetti (2002, 2003, 2006). 
3 Ohno (2009) presents a long-run Kaleckian model which considers capital-labor substitution 
and increasing returns to scale in the production function. In the long-run equilibrium, the 
desired capital-labor ratio and the actual capital-labor ratio are equalized. 
4 Cassetti (2002, pp. 205-206) also points out that the long-run rate of employment in the 
conventional Kaleckian models is not constant. 
5 Rowthorn (1981), Lavoie (1992, p. 322), You (1994), Cassetti (2003), and Stockhammer and 
Onaran (2004) also endogenize technical progress in the Kaleckian model through use of 
Kaldorian technical progress functions. Lima (2004) develops a Kaleckian model with 
endogenous technical progress in which the growth rate of labor productivity depends 
non-linearly on the wage share. 
6 The view that increases in wages induce labor-saving technical change is consistent with an 
empirical study by Marquetti (2004), who investigates the co-integration between real wages 
and labor productivity by using U.S. data. 
7 When the rate of capacity utilization changes, the rate of employment necessarily changes. 
As such, we should combine the short run and the medium run and consider the adjustment 
processes of the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of employment, and the profit share all 
together. However, we separate the short run from the medium run because a 
three-dimensional system is very complicated and because the property of the equilibrium is 
identical in both the three-dimensional system and our system. 




on isoquant curves such that KkuaE )/(= , from which we obtain EYa /= . 
9 Cassetti (2006) uses the investment function that contains the rate of profit as an endogenous 
variable in addition to the rate of capacity utilization. To simplify the analysis, our model uses 
the investment function that contains only the rate of capacity utilization. Introducing the rate 
of profit as a second variable does not change the main results in this paper. For the 
specification of the investment function, see also Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). They assert that 
the profit share, not the rate of profit, should be a variable in the investment function. In this 
case, according to the shape of the investment function, we obtain various equilibrium regimes. 
For this issue, see also Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Blecker (2002). Agliardi (1988) and 
Mott and Slattery (1994) disagree with the logic of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). 
10 For the rate of capacity utilization to be smaller than unity, we need nusm εγε −>−  in 
addition to these two conditions. 
11 Our classification of regimes is based on Blecker (2002). The stagnationist regime contrasts 
with the exhilarationist regime and the wage-led growth regime contrasts with the profit-led 
growth regime. 
12 Cassetti (2002, 2003, 2006) derives an equation of motion for the profit share by specifying 
a price-setting equation of firms and differentiating it with respect to time. However, this 
procedure is unnecessary for deriving the equation of motion for the profit share; plus, our 
procedure is easier than his procedure. With the conflicting-claims inflation theory, the 
price-setting equation in Cassetti’s model plays the role of determining the mark-up rate rather 
than the price level. 
13 If we introduce both the real-wage Phillips curve and equation (10) into our model, the 
medium-run equilibrium can be stable or unstable depending on which effect dominates, the 
effect of the real-wage Phillips curve or the effect of equation (10). However, as long as the 
medium-run equilibrium is stable, results of comparative statics analysis are the same as those 
of our model. Moreover, we can assume that the target profit share of workers depends 
negatively on the growth rate of labor productivity while the target profit share of firms 
depends positively on the growth rate of labor productivity. Because the growth rate of labor 
productivity is an increasing function of the employment rate, it amounts to say that the 




increasing function of the employment rate. In this case also, as long as the medium-run 
equilibrium is stable, similar arguments hold. For details, see section A-3 of the Appendix, 
which is available on request. 
14 The constraint 1,0 << fw θθ  is also adopted by Dutt and Amadeo (1993), who, however, 
do not assume 1=+ wf θθ . Even if we impose only 1,0 << fw θθ  and not 1=+ wf θθ , we 
obtain similar results. 
15 For details, see section A-1 of the Appendix, which is available on request. 
16 For details of comparative statics analysis, see section A-2 of the Appendix, which is 
available on request. 
17 Recall that we assume that wf mm > . With this assumption, an increase in A  corresponds 
to an increase in θ . 
18 Stockhammer (2004) uses a Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) type of investment function, 
thereby leading to both wage-led growth and profit-led growth in the equilibrium. 
19 Cassetti (2006) develops a model in which in addition to the normal rate of capacity 
utilization and the expected rate of capital accumulation, the normal rate of profit and the 
drop-out ratio of capital equipment are also adjusted in the long run. 
20 Lavoie et al. (2004) apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the actual series of capacity 
utilization to obtain the series of normal rates of capacity utilization. Skott (2008) uses the 
Koyck transformation to delete the normal rate of capacity utilization from the estimated 
equation, and accordingly, he dispense with unobservable variables. 
21 The other eigenvalue is the trace of the Jacobian matrix. 
22 For the derivation of equation (20), see section A-4 of the Appendix, which is available on 
request. 
23 For the solution method below, see Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1985) and van de Klundert and 
van Schaik (1990). 
24 Indeed, in addition to these two constraints, there are two additional constraints: one is 
given by λγ +< n , which represents that the long-run equilibrium rate of employment is less 
than unity; the other is given by )(1 nA −−<γ , which represents that the long-run 





25 For numerical computation, we use Mathematica 7. The Mathematica code used is 
available on request. 
26 For the time paths for cases 1 and 2, see sections A-5 and A-6 of the Appendix, which is 















Figure 1: Convergence to the long-run equilibrium










































Figure 2: Cyclical fluctuations in the five-dimensional system
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Appendix to “Conflict, Growth, Distribution, and Employment: A Long-Run 
Kaleckian Model” (not for publication) 
 
A-1: Derivation of the medium-run equilibrium profit share 
We derive the profit share in the medium-run equilibrium. The discriminant of equation (14) 
in the text is given by 
0])()[(2])([)()(4 2222 >+−−+−−+−=−−Θ= εεγεεγε nAsusnAsusnAsD nn . 
Hence, the quadratic equation (14) has the two real and distinct roots, 1m  and 2m . Let 









nAmm ε , 
and thus, both 1m  and 2m  are positive. Rearranging the condition 0>− εsm , we obtain 
sm /ε> . Accordingly, m  has to satisfy this inequality. Let the left-hand side of equation 
(14) be )(mf . Because 0)()/( <−−= nusf εγε , 1m  is smaller than sm /ε= , and 2m  is 
larger than sm /ε= . Therefore, 2m  is the medium-run equilibrium value of the profit share. 
 
A-2: Medium-run comparative statics analysis 
We conduct a comparative statics analysis in the medium-run equilibrium. 
■A rise in A  







From the short-run analysis, we have 0/ <∂∂ mg , and consequently, this derivative is positive. 
Therefore, a rise in A  increases the profit share. 













The denominator is positive and the numerator is negative, and consequently, this derivative is 
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negative. Therefore, a rise in A  decreases the rate of employment. 
 The effect of a rise in A  on u  is opposite to the effect of a rise in A  on m  because u  
is decreasing in m . 
■A rise in s  









The denominator is positive and the numerator is negative, and consequently, this derivative is 
negative. Therefore, a rise in s  decreases the profit share. 









The denominator is positive and the numerator is negative, and consequently, this derivative is 
negative. Therefore, a rise in s  decreases the rate of employment. 
■A rise in n  






The denominator is positive, and consequently, this derivative is negative. Therefore, a rise in 
n  decreases the profit share. 










The denominator is positive and the numerator is negative, and consequently, this derivative is 
negative. Therefore, a rise in n  decreases the rate of employment. 
 The effect of a rise in n  on u  is opposite to the effect of a rise in n  on m  because u  
is decreasing in m . 
 
A-3: Endogenizing the target profit shares of workers and firms 
We explain how our results are modified if we endogenize the workers’ target and the firms’ 
target. 
First, we assume that the target profit share of workers is a decreasing function of the 
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growth rate of labor productivity. 
0)(),( <′= awaww gmgmm . 
Because )(egg aa =  and 0)( >′ ega , we can rewrite it as follows: 
0)(),())(( <′== ememegmm wwaww . 
This equation relates the fruit of labor productivity gain to a wage claim. 
Second, we assume that the target profit share of firms is an increasing function of the 
growth rate of labor productivity. 
0)(),( >′= afaff gmgmm . 
Because )(egg aa =  and 0)( >′ ega , we can rewrite it as follows: 
0)(),())(( >′== ememegmm ffaff . 
This equation relates the fruit of labor productivity gain to a profit claim. 
Using these equations, we obtain the following equation of motion for the profit share.  
)]()()1()()[1(
+−+
−−−−−−= egememmmm awf θθ& , 
where the sing below the variables denotes the sign of the corresponding partial derivative of 
the variable. In this case, 12J  of the Jacobian matrix is modified as follows: 
)]()()1()()[1(12 egememme
mJ awf ′+′−+′−=∂
∂= θθ& , 
which is evaluated at the medium-run equilibrium. 
When we do not endogenize the targets, the first and second terms in the square bracket of 
the right-hand side will be zero, which yields 012 >J  with 0)( >′ ega , as in the text. 
 When we endogenize the targets, the first term is positive and the second term is negative. 
If the negative effect of 0)( <′ emw  is smaller than the other two positive effects, we have 
012 >J , and accordingly, the foregoing analysis remains unchanged. If, on the other hand, the 
negative effect of 0)( <′ emw  is larger than the other two positive effects, we have 012 >J , 
which is likely to yield 0det <J . In this case, the medium-run equilibrium corresponds to the 
saddle point, and hence, it is unstable. 
 If the medium-run equilibrium is stable, that is, 012 >J  and hence 0det >J , results of 
comparative statics analysis remain unchanged. For example, the effect of a rise in the 


































Here, we assume )()( emem wf >  as in the text. Then, the numerator of the right-hand side is 
positive. In our model, the short-run equilibrium corresponds to wage-led growth, and hence, 
we have 0)( <′ mg . From 0)( >′ ega  and 012 >J , the denominator of the right-hand side is 
negative. It follows that we have 0/ <θdde : a rise in the bargaining power of firms lowers 
the equilibrium employment rate, which is the same as that in the text. Similar arguments hold 
for other derivatives. 
 
A-4: Derivation of equation (20) 
We derive equation (20) in the text. In the long-run equilibrium, ∗∗u  and nu  are equalized, 











Because we know that the long-run equilibrium value of the profit share is given by 










The long-run equilibrium values of nu  and γ  have to satisfy equation (3-2), which is a 
rewritten form of equation (20). Substituting equation (15) in the text into ∗∗m  of equation 























A-5: Convergence and path-dependency in the five-dimensional system with relatively 
small initial values (Case 1) 















A-6: Convergence and path-dependency in the five-dimensional system with relatively 
large initial values (Case 2) 
Time paths of the five variables in Case 2 of table 3 are as follows: 
 
